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Not Just Mere Things
  Thomas E. Wartenberg 
Abstract
This paper examines Arthur Danto's contention, put forward in The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, that at a certain point in its history
art becomes philosophy. The similarities and differences between Danto's
view and the Hegelian one from which it is derived are examined. Using
Danto's favorite example of a philosophical work of art, Andy Warhol's
Brillo Box (1965), it is argued that a more plausible interpretation of the
meaning of the work undermines Danto's claims about art's
transformation into philosophy.
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I am honored to be a part of this Symposium to honor the 25th
anniversary of the publication of Arthur Danto's The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace.[1] I recall reading the book for the first time in the spring
of 1986 when I was on sabbatical in Munich writing a book on social
power. I was stunned when I first read The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace and that impression has only deepened when I returned to
it, as I have numerous times, in the intervening years. Here is a short list
of some of the things about the book that draw me to it: Danto's witty
and pithy writing style; his marvelous interpretation of works of art,
interpretations that allow me to understand previously unintelligible
works; his bold attempt to develop a definition of art that could withstand
the many counterexamples that had developed over the years; his
enlightening interpretations of philosophers of art, from Aristotle to
Nietzsche and from Bell to Weitz, that treat them as partners in a grand
conversation about art.
Each of these features of the book, and many others besides, deserves to
be discussed at length and some of them will be by the papers that follow
mine in this symposium. But the one on which I shall focus is a claim that
Danto makes about the relationship between art and philosophy that has
always fascinated me. In the third chapter of The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace entitled "Philosophy and Art," Danto asserts that art has
"itself evolved in such a way that the philosophical question of its status
has almost become the very essence of art itself. . . ." And he goes on to
cite Hegel, claiming that "art virtually exemplifies Hegel's teaching about
history, according to which spirit is destined to become conscious of
itself." (TCP, 56) Although the most familiar aspect of these claims is
Danto's embrace of Hegel's thesis of the end of art, they also impress
upon us the question of how we are to distinguish art from its own
philosophy, if at all, given the fact that art itself has come to pose the
philosophical question about its nature. Can we say that, on Danto's view,
art becomes philosophy at a certain point in its development?
As he makes clear in making his claim about art's achievement of self-
consciousness or self-referentiality, Danto sees himself following in
Hegel's big, if somewhat ungainly footsteps. But Hegel's claim about art
differs from Danto's in some significant respects. A first difference has to
do with the subject-matter of art. For Hegel, art's subject is reality as
such. In its own unique way, art attempts to express the truths about
reality that are also the subject-matter of religion and philosophy, the
other two forms of absolute knowledge. So, for example, Hegel thinks
that the narrative of Sophocles' Antigone — a paradigmatic work of art
from his point of view — highlights the contradictions in ancient Greek
society that led to its downfall and supersession by Rome, viz. its inability
to reconcile the demands of the individual with those of society. The play
personifies two abstract — and, hence, philosophical — principles of right
in Creon (universality) and Antigone (individuality), using the story of the
characters' tragic clash to demonstrate the inevitable conflict between the
principles as they are embodied in Greek society.
But art for Danto, at least at the point where it becomes self-conscious, is
less concerned with reality as such than it is with its own nature. Roy
Lichtenstein's Brushstroke paintings of the late 1960's, for example, take
as their subject-matter brushstrokes, Danto tells us, an obvious element
of all painting and, especially, abstract expressionism, the object of
Lichtenstein's critique. (TCP, 107 ff.) So in spite of sharing a cognitive
orientation towards art, Danto and Hegel differ significantly on what art is
about.
Part of the explanation of this difference between Danto's and Hegel's
views is the differing artistic context in which they articulated their two
theories of art's nature. Writing in the first decades of the nineteen the
century, Hegel was a contemporary of the Romantic art movement. He
saw this as the latest, and the last, phase of art's historical development.
It boggles the mind to wonder what Hegel would have made of much
modern and contemporary art. For Danto, on the other hand, it is
precisely the works of post-World War II American art that clearly expose
the possibility of art becoming philosophy. And, as is well-known, the
artist who develops the philosophical potential of art, according to Danto,
is Andy Warhol.[2] So if Danto thinks that art became philosophy at a
certain point in its history, we would expect him to point to Warhol as the
artist who best exemplifies this development. And it is therefore no
surprise to discover an article of his entitled, "The Philosopher as Andy
Warhol."[3] But we need to be cautious in attributing too much
significance to the article's title, since Danto takes it from the ironic one
Warhol gave his own 1975 book, The Philosophy of Andy Warhol (From A
to B and Back Again).[4]
Let's spend a moment, then, considering how Danto characterizes the
philosophical significance of Warhol's art in that 1999 essay. "Since at
least Warhol's exhibition of Brillo (and other) cartons at the Stable Gallery
on East 74th Street in Manhattan in the spring of 1964," he begins, "I
have felt him to possess a philosophical intelligence of an intoxicatingly
high order." [PAW 62] He goes on to say, "I believe it was among
Warhol's chief philosophical contributions to the history of art that he
brought artistic practice to a level of philosophical self-consciousness
never before attained." [PAW 63] There follows an approving reference to
Hegel's identification of art and philosophy as two forms of absolute spirit.
And Danto then identifies his project in the essay with the following
words: "to reveal some fragments of the philosophical structure of
Warhol's art." [PAW 63] So if Warhol's art is not itself philosophy, it does
have, at a minimum according to Danto, philosophical structure and it
also makes a philosophical contribution. I take this to mean that, while
still retaining their identity as works of art, Warhol's art—or, at least,
some of it—is also philosophy.
So let's consider Danto's favorite example of a philosophical work of art,
Andy Warhol's Brillo Box of 1965. The work consists of a wooden box that
is painted with red, white, and blue silkscreen paint so as to appear
identical to the cardboard cartons in which boxes of Brillo pads were
shipped to grocery stores in the early 1960s. (See illustration below.)
Why might Danto think that this apparently simple work is a paradigmatic
instance of philosophy done in art? I think that Danto has two very
different reasons for making this claim. The first is that it is a
counterexample to all the theories of art that preceded its creation. None
of the main contenders in the marketplace for an adequate definition of
art — such as those that posit art as imitation, expression, significant
form, etc. — can account for Brillo Box being the work of art that Danto
takes it to be.[5] The reason for this is that, at the time the work was
made, there existed myriad other objects that were perceptually identical
with Brillo Box that were not works of art: namely, those cartons
containing the boxes of Brillo pads then in the storage rooms of countless
supermarkets and grocery stores across the U.S. Since each of these
shared all of Brillo Box's perceptual properties, Brillo Box's status as a
work of art could not be attributed to its possession of the very properties
that it shares with those more mundane cartons. So Brillo Box counts as
philosophy in the first instance, according to Danto, because its
dramatization of the problem of perceptual indistinguishability make it a
counterexample to the major theories of art that existed prior to its
creation.
This allows us to recognize a second respect in which Danto's view differs
from Hegel's: Danto posits Brillo Box as itself a philosophical
counterexample, whereas Hegel thinks art requires philosophical
supplementation to adequately establish its claims. Danto saw Warhol as
making a philosophical counterexample by means of a work of art — Brillo
Box — one that did not need Danto's subsequent commentary to make its
point. It is for this reason that he speaks in the essay of Warhol as
making a philosophical contribution to art. Although Hegel thinks of both
art and philosophy as forms of absolute spirit and, as such, capable of
expressing the same truths, he thinks that they do so in different ways,
with art needing philosophy to put its images into the form proper for
philosophical thinking, viz. concepts. Because art is, according to Hegel,
pictorial thinking, it must be supplemented by philosophy proper through
conceptual means alone. So whereas Hegel claimed that art's sensuous
form required the conceptual supplementation contributed by its
philosophical interpreters, Danto's initial point about Brillo Box is that it is
an art object that we might be tempted to call a work of philosophy in
artistic form. So on Danto's view, Warhol's piece does not suffer from the
lack Hegel characterized all art as having—the "impurity" of its content—
one that Hegel thought meant that art required supplementation by
philosophy proper in order for truth to be adequately grasped.
As I have indicated, there is a second reason why Danto takes Brillo Box
to count as philosophy, one that allies his view more closely to Hegel's.
He thinks that Brillo Box was not only a counterexample to these
contending definitions of art but that it also formulated a criterion that a
successful definition of art would have to satisfy. Although the question of
what makes a work of art a distinctive type of entity had long been
discussed by philosophers of art, Danto views Warhol's work as making
philosophers accept a subtle shift in how the question had to be posed.
After Brillo Box, it became clear that a definition of art, if it was to
distinguish works of art from the rest of reality, had to contend with, to
use Danto's term, "mere things" from which the artwork was visually
indistinguishable. And for this reason Danto thinks that Brillo Box changed
the way in which the basic question about the ontology of works of art is
formulated. Subsequent to Warhol, philosophers cannot just ask what
makes something a work of art, but need to ask about works that have
perceptually identical counterparts that are not works of art why is that —
the artwork — a work of art, when that — the counterpart — is not. This
is a new formulation of the traditional question in the philosophy of art I
take Danto to be asserting because, among other things, it implicitly
rules out certain answers: those that take the distinction between art and
non-art to be based upon perceptual criteria. So holding that artworks
have special perceptual properties such as that of possessing significant
form gets ruled out of court as a definition of art, for such a view cannot
successfully address the reason why perceptually identical counterparts to
genuine works of art do not count as themselves art. Art is not, as Danto
put it, something that the eye can descry. And it is this that Warhol's
work established.
Why Danto takes this to be an important advance in the discussion of
what makes something a work of art can be seen in his rejection of the
then-popular Wittgenstein answer to the question. The Wittgensteinian
argues that the philosophical attempt to find some property in virtue of
which works of art can be distinguished from everything else in the world
rests upon a mistake, as is evident in the rhetorical question that forms
the title of William Kennick's influential essay, "Does Traditional Aesthetics
Rest on a Mistake?"[6] According to Kennick, traditional philosophy of
art's mistake was the assumption that a concept like art could be defined
by specifying a set of necessary and sufficient criteria that anything
would have to satisfy in order to count as an instance of the concept. To
use the example made famous by W.V.O. Quine, on this view of concepts,
"bachelor" is defined by two criteria each of which is singly necessary and
both of which are jointly sufficient for something to count as a bachelor:
"being male" and "being unmarried." But Wittgenstein had showed,
according to Kennick and others, that this understanding of concepts (or
words) was a mistake. Through his notion of a language-game,
Wittgenstein had established that the words of a language function
through overlapping similarities and differences, much like that of a
family. To be a member of a family, one does not have to possess any
specific property, like being red-headed or pug-nosed, for the properties
that characterize a family shift as one views different members of the
group.
To show the applicability of this view of concepts (language) to "art,"
Kennick asked us to envision a warehouse filled with both art objects
and, to use Danto's terminology, mere things. Kennick claimed that the
ordinary person — much championed by Wittgensteinians — would have
no trouble picking out all and only the art objects in the warehouse, even
though she was unable to define 'art.' But Warhol's art, according to
Danto, called into question exactly what Kennick took to be
unproblematic: our ability to distinguish art objects from other things
based solely on their appearances. How would the ordinary person, faced
with Brillo Box and its perceptually-identical counterpart, decide whether
to remove one of the works, both, or neither? Clearly, not by looking at
them, for there is no difference to be discerned between their visual
appearances. Whatever the difference between them is, it cannot lie in
something that can be seen from a simple inspection of them. Warhol's
achievement in Brillo Box was to show that the standard ways of posing
the question of what makes something a work of art prior to Warhol are
inadequate, that the question has to be raised in a philosophically more
perspicuous manner so as to be able to take account of the problem of
perceptually identical counterparts.
It is my contention that Danto's articulation of this second aspect of the
philosophical significance of Brillo Box puts him much closer to Hegel. For
it becomes clear that Danto thinks that one reason that Brillo Box should
be accorded artistic status is his own philosophical interpretation of it that
shows what its philosophical significance is. Once we realize that Danto
himself provides the purely conceptual version of the claim that he thinks
Warhol made visually with Brillo Box, namely, that a successful definition
of art would have to explain why this object is a work of art while its
counterparts in the grocery storerooms are not, it becomes harder to
distinguish Danto view from Hegel's. Thus philosophy, on this
interpretation of Danto's claims, follows on the foot heels of art, providing
proper conceptual form for the view that had already been made, albeit
visually, by the artwork itself. And as we have seen, this is precisely the
view that Hegel himself adopts in calling for philosophy's supplementation
of art.
So, enlightened by Brillo Box on the proper form of the question about
art's nature, Danto thought himself able to articulate in The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, if not a full-blown definition of art,
some necessary criteria for a thing's being a work of art. Starting with
the insight that a work of art, unlike a "mere thing," has to be about
something, Danto developed a range of more specific characterizations of
the aboutness of artworks that would, he hoped, account for the artistic
status of Brillo Box.[7] In particular, he argued that works of art are
distinguished from their more mundane counterparts by the possession of
meaning, a feature that those things are said to lack. And he asserted
that we should understand an artwork's possession of meaning on the
model of a metaphor, for they also had cognitive elements that could not
be reduced to simpler forms of meaning.
At this point, I want to raise the question of whether Danto's account of
the distinction between works of art and mere things is adequate to the
task of distinguishing artworks from other types of existing entities. Part
of the problem here is understanding exactly what he means by a "mere
thing." It is worth pausing to note how difficult it is to explicate this
concept. Part of the rhetorical force this notion has in Danto's writing is
the deflationary force of the "mere." Works of art acquire a certain
elevated status when all the other "things" from which they need to be
distinguished are referred to as "mere." But what exactly are we to
understand by this "mere"? In what does the mereness of a "mere thing"
consist? A first attempt might be to identify it with what other
philosophers have called "mid-sized physical objects," among which they
include things like tables and apples. The trouble is that there are other
types of things in the world besides such mid-sized physical objects and
artworks, in particular other types of representations. An adequate
definition of art needs not only to distinguish artworks from such
apparently obvious instances of non-art as tables and apples, but it also
needs to distinguish them from other types of representations such as
newspapers stories and sociological treatises. This is why Danto spends a
great deal of effort in The Transfiguration of the Commonplace
distinguishing works of art from other species of representation, such as
political tracts and even philosophical essays. He will be able to offer an
adequate definition of art (or, more modestly, a set of necessary criteria
for something being art) only if he can show that it was capable of more
than just distinguishing works of art from mere things, though that task
was certainly essential to finding an adequate definition of art.
This helps us understand the presence of one of the fascinating aspects of
The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: the parallel that Danto draws in
it between a variety of different representational realms and what he calls
their material counterparts. These include: inscriptions and words, bodies
and minds, bodily movements and actions, mere things and works of art.
In each case, Danto claims that an intentional notion supervenes upon a
material base. Thus, for example, mere marks on a piece of paper don't
constitute a word, though they are, to be sure, its material counterpart.
Words only exist once we enter the realm of meanings, an intentional
one, and it is this realm that can, to use Danto's pregnant phrase,
transfigure mere marks on a surface into meaningful elements in a
linguistic system. And similarly for each of the pairs of terms listed
above: the former are transformed into the latter when they take their
rightful place within an intentional system of meanings.
The synoptic and systematic point of view that we can see Danto
mobilizing here is one of the real virtues of The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace, for it helps us see why the philosophy of art is more than
a marginal field in the domain of philosophy, despite that not being the
majority view in the philosophical profession these days. (The recently
published Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, to cite the latest
outrage, lacks a section on aesthetics, though it claims to "give readers a
sense of the range and excitement of contemporary analytic philosophy
[excluding formal logic]."[8]) Indeed, at times Danto suggests that
questions about art and its distinction from philosophy lie at the very root
of the philosophical enterprise itself, as if philosophy had to defend itself
against art's claims to a legitimacy that philosophy desired to take for
itself alone.[9]
So there is a clear philosophical explanation for Danto's concern with
representational domains other than that of art: the need to develop an
account of art that distinguishes it from them. But there are other
supplementary explanations that cast additional light on the book and its
philosophical significance.
At the time Danto wrote the book, not only were Wittgenstein accounts of
meaning widely accepted, as we have seen in Kennick's application of
them to the issue of defining art, but the ideas of W.V.O. Quine were also
in their ascendancy. Among Quine's many significant claims, the one that
is relevant here is his attack on the traditional notion of (linguistic)
meaning. After Frege, philosophers had assumed that language was to be
understood as a system in which words had both what Frege termed
"meaning" (Sinn) and "reference" (Bedeutung). The reference of a word
is, quite simply, the non-linguistic item that the word picks out. Thus, the
reference of the word "rabbit" is the cute, furry creature that we all take
the word to apply to.
According to Frege, a word's meaning is that which enables us to pick out
its reference. Although there had been a tendency to think of meanings
as mental pictures, Frege's point is that this is too graphic a way of
understanding them. But what exactly his alternative account was is not
easy to say. Suffice it to say for our purposes here, there was a great
deal of discussion of what exactly a Fregean meaning was, whether it was
purely mental, etc.
Enter Quine. In his famous argument for the Indeterminacy of
Translation, he attacked the coherence of the post-Fregean notion of
meaning.[10] Imagining a situation of "radical translation" in which a
linguist confronts a tribe whose language he has no prior way of
understanding, Quine argued that there was no unambiguous way to
understand the meaning associated with a word, no way to interpret a
person's linguistic behavior that did not import empirically ungrounded
assumptions about how they understood the world. When a native uttered
"gavagai" in the presence of a rabbit, there was no way for the linguist to
decide whether the native was referring to a rabbit or to an undetached
rabbit part, etc. Only by investing the native's utterance with an ontology
in a manner that could not be given an empirical justification could the
linguist provide a meaning for the native term, gavagai.
This brief summary does not convey the power of Quine's argument,
which had a huge impact on analytic philosophers in the 1960's. The
result was that "meaning" fell into disrepute as a way of understanding
the nature of language.[11] It was assumed that an adequate theory of
language would have to be purely extensional, that is, not make
reference to any such suspicious entities as meanings. Although Quine's
own attempt to give a behaviorist account of meaning was generally
acknowledged to be a failure, this did not lessen the suspicion with which
the notion of meaning was viewed in the wake of his onslaught against
it.[12] And linguistic meaning was not the only notion upon which doubt
was cast, but mental states more generally as well as the distinction
between actions and mere behaviors.
What does this have to do with The Transfiguration of the Commonplace?
My point is only that to comprehend the structure of the book and the
presence of certain extended discussions within it, it is important to
realize the intellectual context within which the book was written, one in
which there was widespread hostility to the notion of meaning. Since
Danto is attempting to argue for a view of art in which art objects are
things that are imbued with meaning — not linguistic to be sure, but
meaning nonetheless — he needs to show that reference to such a notion
is philosophically respectable. And to do that, he needs to make a
general, anti-behaviorist philosophical argument that shows why
reference to such things as mental states and meanings is not only
legitimate, but necessary. For this reason, Danto pays a great deal of
attention to the analogy between linguistic meaning, actions, and works
of art. In all of these domains, the Quinean preference for "desert
landscapes," which had denied the legitimacy of certain intentional
notions, had to be shown to be problematic. As a result, I think that it is
important, in addition to acknowledging The Transfiguration of the
Commonplace as a superb work in the philosophy of art, to recognize the
role that this book played in changing the general philosophical hostility to
the notion of meaning — and other intentional concepts — that was so
prevalent when the book was written.
So let us return now to Brillo Box and Danto's contention that it marks
the transformation of art into philosophy. First, we need to consider the
work's more ordinary counterparts in the grocer's storeroom:[13]
These latter, which one might take as examples of the mere things of The
Transfiguration of the Commonplace, are not—as Danto explicitly
recognized subsequently—mere things, if what we mean by this are mid-
sized physical objects, for like art objects, they are composed of both a
representational component and what Danto calls its "material
counterpart." Indeed, we can go beyond this description to say that they
are containers of commodities bearing commercial art upon their
surfaces. The cartons in the grocery store are, to use Heidegger's term,
Zeug (equipment): They are "holders" that make it possible to ship and
store the individual Brillo boxes that consumers can purchase, themselves
being further "holders" of the soap pads people wish to use to clean their
pots. The painted surfaces of these cartons include the word "Brillo,"
thereby allowing them to refer to the product they contain. Hardly mere
things, these cartons have a rich ontological structure that is obscured
when they are put into the lowly category of mere thingdom.
But why do I think it is crucial to recognize the complex ontological
structure of ordinary Brillo cartons? For one thing, it suggests an
interpretation of Warhol's work different from that put forward by Danto
in Transfiguration of the Commonplace and elsewhere. On this other
interpretation, Warhol sought less to elevate mere things to artistic status
than to blur or transgress the boundary between commercial art and fine
art. If Brillo Box and the Brillo carton in the storeroom are
indistinguishable, we can ask, following Danto, what is it that accounts for
the difference in the status that these two things possess? But what gets
called into question by the two objects' perceptual indistinguishability, I
am suggesting, is the distinction between commercial and fine art, rather
than that between artworks and mere things.
Since commercial art is, by its very definition, art that is employed for a
commercial purpose, an obvious place to start would be to say that the
storage room carton fulfills a specific commercial purpose — enabling the
product to be stored, transported, and identified among other things —
while the Warhol piece does not. Indeed, it cannot since there is nothing
inside it to store, transport, or identify. Although the two things are
visually identical, they have very different uses and are treated very
differently by us.
But this, in turn, raises the question of what purpose this artwork serves.
Is it, in distinction from its grocery store relative, simply useless? And, if
so, why look at it? Even more pressing is the question: Why buy it when
you could get a more useful version of it for a lot less money in a grocery
store? Ric Burns' recent film, Andy Warhol: A Documentary Film (2006)
includes a gallery owner explaining that, when he showed Warhol's
Campbell's Soup Cans at his gallery, a competitor went to a local grocery
and put cans of Cambell's Soup on display for sale at 29¢. It might also
not be out of place to mention here that the director of the National
Gallery of Canada helped Canadian customs officials at the time
determine that Warhol's boxes were not sculptures and so subject to
duty. Is the appellation art merely a way of evading such taxes?
Following this line of reasoning, we might develop an interpretation of
Brillo Box according to which it asserts that works of commercial art are
as deserving of our aesthetic attention as works of fine art . We can have
as complete aesthetic experiences looking at the grocer's carton as we
can at Warhol's work, in so far as what we are looking at is a striking
design made with intense colors. The question this in turn poses is less,
"Why bother with fine art when we are surrounded by commercial
products whose surfaces could afford us experiences as rich and varied as
those traditionally associated only with the products of fine art?" than
with "Why we don't take advantage of the aesthetic opportunities offered
to us by the surfaces of commercial art products that populate our world
so densely?"
We can support the notion that Warhol sought to problematize the
distinction between fine and commercial art in Brillo Box by noting that
Warhol himself was a highly successful commercial artist prior to turning
to fine art. Given his professional transformation, it makes sense that he
might seek through his art to raise questions about the difference
between products of commercial art and those of fine art, to show that
they are not as distinct as our categorization makes us think.
Even though I have been critical of Danto's interpretation of Warhol's
work—shall we call it a sculpture?—I agree with him that it renders the
designation "art" problematic. Our disagreement is over the context for
that disagreement, the term that we take to be vying with "(fine) art" in
Warhol's piece. Whereas he takes it to be "mere thing," I have been
suggesting that it is actually "commercial art." Why is this interpretive
disagreement philosophically significant?
The reason is this: On my interpretation of Brillo Box, it is less a
propadeutic to renewed philosophical speculation on the nature of (fine)
art than it is a tactic in the deconstruction of that concept as it has
developed in the West. That is, if we find Brillo Box no more worthy of our
aesthetic attention than the grocer's carton with its commercial art
surface, why not simply reject philosophical justifications of fine art as
requiring a distinctive type of entity, one that is suitable for our
attention?
To this point, my discussion of Brillo Box only contests Danto's
interpretation of Warhol's work. I have not yet addressed the significance
that this interpretive dispute might have for his more general philosophy
of art, specifically for the claim that art became philosophy at a certain
point in its history. I turn now to that task.
In discussing this thesis of Danto's, I pointed out that Danto believes that
Brillo Box should count as philosophy for two reasons: It is a
counterexample to previous definitions of art and it provides a more
philosophically perspicuous form to the question of what art is. But if my
interpretation of Brillo Box is convincing, it shows that it fulfills neither of
these two desiderata. If Warhol's work is a deconstruction of the fine
art/commercial art distinction, it cannot be classified as philosophy for
either of the reasons that Danto suggests. And this suggests that Danto's
account of art's self-transformation into philosophy loses its prime
justificatory example.
Let me conclude by reiterating my admiration for The Transfiguration of
the Commonplace. It is a truly remarkable work for many reasons. The
one that I have discussed here is its contention that works of art can be
philosophy. This is a fruitful idea, one that I have been greatly intrigued
by. Despite the misgivings I have outlined about Danto's answer to this
question, my thinking about the relationship between art and philosophy
has been deeply influenced by this deep and admirable book. For that, I
can only thank its author, who has enriched my philosophical life and that
of many of the others who have read and absorbed the claims of this
extraordinary book.[14]
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